This article does not to seek a universal answer to the question of what morality or public morals are; rather it focuses on the issue of morality as grounds for limiting constitutional rights and freedoms. We narrow the problem to constitutional practice, and in particular to the
INTRODUCTION
The notions of morality and freedom as well as their mutual interaction have long been the subject of endless disputes between philosophers, theologians, and lawyers. The problem lies in the concept of "morality" and "freedom", the meanings of which may be determined in a number of situational, ideological, and methodological contexts. In general, public morality in philosophical and theological sciences is defined as a relation of deeds to the standards of social ethics. 1 The Western culture appropriated social standards from older cultures of Sumer, Akkad, Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Israel, Persia, numerous other cultures of the Middle East, from the Minoan, Greek and finally the Roman culture. Christianity adopted the ethical essence from all of those cultures and it later transpired that fundamental moral standards are the same in many cultures of the world. Christianity, however, unified and refined that universal moral code due to the revelation of the Old (Decalogue) and New Testament, devising what it presents as the perfect code of moral standards. Naturally, that code continues to develop and is open to new moral issues while preserving its objective identity. 2 However, some believe that no morality or ethics, especially deriving from Catholicism (Christianity), should be addressed in the public (political) domain as it would inhibit the natural, desirable processes characteristic for that area. 3 It is assumed that there exists no "objective mirror" in which man and the entirety of humanity can look at itself and judge whether it is moral or immoral. After that "common human mirror" broke, shards were created, i.e. pluralistic, relative and subjective ethics. Ethics is typically considered a religious construct, depriving man of freedom. 4 In simplified terms, 1 Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, "Moralność"; in: Andrzej Maryniarczyk, ed., Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii, vol. VII (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2006). 2 Conscience is not merely a sense or feeling. It is an act of practical reason, determining whether to do something or not, if one should perform a given act, or if one is not allowed to do so and whether the act is morally good or evil. The very core of conscience is the principle of the most general moral standard: "One should do good and avoid evil." However, conscience itself is not what is objectively good and what is evil, it only judges whether I am on the side of good or on the side of evil. I must therefore confront my conscience with moral standards and codes, not dependent only on me. From the beginning, humanity developed moral standards and combined them into collections, akin to the codes of law as such. 3 See in general: Jan Hartman, Etyka. Poradnik dla grzeszników (Warszawa: Agora, 2015); Ulrik Nissen, Sven Andersen, and Lars Reuter, eds., The Sources of Public Morality: On the Ethics and Religion Debate: Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Societas Ethica in Berlin, August 2001 (Münster: LIT 2003). 4 A good example is a renowned Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbiński (died in 1981), who as an atheist in scientific works presented ethics independent of religion, but the essential content of that ethics continued to be Christian because the author came from a Christian family and was a believer for a time. From the other hand: "We do not enforce a positive moral ideal, but rather limit enforceable morality to the absolute minimum we need for living together. Our democratic system constitutes indeed a major negative insight into human character: we tolerate a number of competing ideas on the supposition that we are safer from tyranny when no one person or group can claim a right to all the power. No religious or political philosophy may be pushed at the expense of any other, for we know well the ugly results of attempting to enshrine one ideal by punishing all dissident religious or political views" (Christopher F. Mooney, "Public Morality and Law", Journal of Law and Religion 1 (1983): 54-55).
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 140 freedom signifies independence. It is an attribute of humanity that allows us, as rational beings, to assess our own behaviour. 5 This article does not to seek a universal answer to the question of what morality   or public morals are, and it does not describe relationships between law and morality, which long have been the subject of study of philosophers and philosophers of law. 6 We focus on the issue of morality as grounds for limiting constitutional rights and freedoms. We narrow the problem to constitutional practice, and in particular to the judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (hereinafter: Tribunal or constitutional court), which settles disputes centered around the freedom of man and public morals.
MORALITY AS A RATIONALE FOR RESTRICTING PERSONAL FREEDOM
The starting point for further analysis is the assertion that the rights or freedoms guaranteed to individuals are not of an absolute nature. Many international acts or constitutional charters guarantee inalienable and inherent human dignity which is the source of personal rights and freedoms, while stipulating interference with and limitation thereof by reason of "morality" or "public morals". 7 By way of example, art. 29.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be called upon, according to which "in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society". The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also refers to morality as grounds for restriction of the right to a fair trial, the right to privacy, the freedom of religion, the freedom of expression 8 and the freedom of assembly. Morality is also present in the text of the ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019
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Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania of 1992 9 , e.g. art. 25(3) 10 , 26 (4) 11 , 36 12 and 43 13 .
The problem of morality as a rationale for limiting rights and freedoms is not theoretical but practical. 14 10 "The freedom to express convictions and to impart information shall be incompatible with criminal actions-incitement to national, racial, religious, or social hatred, incitement to violence or to discrimination, as well as defamation and disinformation" (The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted by the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania in the Referendum of 25 October 1992 // http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm). 11 "The freedom to profess and spread religion or belief may not be limited otherwise than by law and only when this is necessary to guarantee the security of society, public order, the health or morals of people, or other basic rights or freedoms of the person" (ibid.). 12 "Citizens may not be prohibited or hindered from assembling unarmed in peaceful meetings. This right may not be limited otherwise than by law and only when this is necessary to protect the security of the State or society, public order, the health or morals of people, or the rights or freedoms of other persons" (ibid.). 13 "The State shall recognise the churches and religious organisations that are traditional in Lithuania; other churches and religious organisations shall be recognised provided that they have support in society, and their teaching and practices are not in conflict with the law and public morals" (ibid.). 14 15 An administrative penalty was imposed on the advertiser, which was upheld by the Lithuanian administrative courts. After using the legal means, the advertiser lodged an application with the ECHR requesting a determination that freedom of expression had been interfered with (Article 10 of the Convention). 16 Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, supra note 14.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER However, we omit the issue of constitutional axiology, as it is a broad subject which extends well beyond the limited framework of this article. We focus on the term "morality", which features as many as six times in the text of the Constitution, 20 specifically, morality as grounds for limiting freedom and human and rights. Within that meaning, the term of interest to us is referenced twice: 1) "Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights" (art. 31.3 of the Constitution); 2) "The freedom to publicly express religion may be limited only by means of statute and only where this is necessary for the defence of State security, public order, health, morals or the freedoms and rights of others" (art. 53.5 of the Constitution). At the outset, a certain lack of consistency by the authors of the constitution should indicated, as in the first 17 Marek Piechowiak, "Elementy prawnonaturalne w stosowaniu Konstytucji RP," Przegląd Sejmowy 5 (2009): 75. 18 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, adopted on 2 April, 1997 as published in Dziennik Ustaw No. 78, item 483 // https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. 19 Marcin Dąbrowski, "Antywartości konstytucyjne. Wprowadzenie do problematyki," Przegląd Sejmowy 5 (2018): 24. 20 For example, a citizen whose religious beliefs or moral principles do not allow him to perform military service may be obliged to perform alternative service (Article 83 sec. 3). In addition, Poland protects children against demoralization (Article 72 of the Constitution). Parents have the right to ensure that children receive moral and religious education and teachings in accordance with their convictions (Article 53 sec. 3 of the Constitution). Everyone has the right to a public hearing. Exceptions to the public nature of hearings may be made for reasons of morality (Article 45 of the Constitution).
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 143 instance morality was defined by the adjective "public", while there is no such specification in the other. Moreover, the Constitution, much like the Convention, does not clarify the substance of public morals and morality, 21 nor does it contain direct guidelines on how to determine its meaning. 22 
WHAT DOES MEAN THE PUBLIC MORALITY?
The legal doctrine attempts to bridge the abovementioned gap. 23 It is stated in the recent commentaries to the Constitution that public morals are based on moral standards and judgments. Moral standards should be construed as standards provided with axiological justification by moral judgments. However, moral judgments are "qualifications of human behaviours made from the perspective of certain points of reference which may vary, depending on the presented trend or concept of morality". 24 The authors identify two trends of morality. One is a perfectionist trend, according to which a moral assessment of human behaviour is made from the perspective of compliance with specific models of perfection or human dignity. The other solidarity-based trend assesses the approach of man to the socalled common. 25 
PUBLIC MORALS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL IN

POLAND
It is a cliché that the vast majority of cases pending before the Constitutional Tribunal concern the limitation of the domain of law and freedoms originating from the ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019
147
The Constitution guarantees everyone the freedom of religion, 39 but its manifestation may be restricted for the defence of State security, public order, health, morals or the freedoms and rights of others (art. 53 sec. 5 of the Constitution). The Constitutional Tribunal took the position that the ban on ritual slaughter (i.e. the obligation to stun animals) limits the constitutional freedom to manifest religion. However, it had to answer the question whether that limitation is necessary to defend the security of the State, public order, health, the freedoms and rights of others, as well as to protect morality.
In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, "it is impossible to claim that the rationale of safeguarding morality, which was largely forged by the Judaeo-Christian religion and tradition, could justify the contested restriction of the freedom to manifest religion." 40 Further, "morality is understood and explained in a number of ways." 41 In the legal sciences morality is construed as a system of moral standards recognized in a given society, relating to interpersonal relations. The matter of ritual slaughter should be analysed in the context of man's relationship to animals. The human-animal relationship does not fit into the traditional meaning and essence of morality. However, it may not be ruled out that in the future human behaviour towards animals will be assessed from the perspective of moral standards. Finally, the Constitutional Tribunal stated that an implicit order to stun an animal (prohibition of ritual slaughter) was not necessary to protect morality. That order was in fact an expression of concern for farm animals. The care and protection of livestock does not constitute, in the light of the Constitution, 42 sufficient grounds for restricting the freedom to manifest religion.
That ruling proved divisive for the judges, who filed 7 dissenting opinions. First of all, they disagreed with the constitutional limitation of the term "morality" to interpersonal relations.
According to the simplest and most common definition, morality is the art of distinguishing between good and evil. In these categories, the relations of a person to farm animals can most certainly be qualified in the context of ritual slaughter -from the point of view of morals, killing them in the manner which is 39 The Constitution guarantees everyone the freedom of religion (Article 53 of the Constitution). The last case, which produced little response, concerned property rights, also subject to constitutional protection. 50 The relationship between public morals and state-owned agricultural property was acknowledged by the Constitutional Tribunal in a case initiated by the Regional Court. The facts of the case were as follows. The
Agricultural Property Agency (hereinafter: the APA) brought an action before the in an amount equal to 5 times the amount of the asking rent that would be due for that property, were it the subject of a tenancy agreement following a tender." 51 In the opinion of the Regional Court, that provision is of a repressive nature due to such an excessive amount of remuneration. In fact, it was the amount of remuneration that was the essence of the constitutional issue. The rights (ownership rights) of the farmer, which under the challenged provision obliged him to pay an exorbitant amount, were seriously prejudiced. In the opinion of the Regional Court, the legislator limited his ownership of cash (impoverished him) in a disproportionate manner and the ownership right is subject to constitutional protection (art. 64 of the Constitution).
However, such protection is not absolute and may be restricted, albeit in a manner consistent with the principle of proportionality.
The Constitutional Tribunal stated that the contested provision is consistent with the Constitution and does not infringe upon the principle of proportionality. That ruling was underpinned by "public morals", which permeate the structure of that is good and what is evil (the primacy of the "will of the majority").
Another conclusion is that the reasoning of the Constitutional Tribunal lacks consistency. On the one hand, it limits the public morals clause to interpersonal relations which do not include the attitude of humans to animals (ritual slaughter).
On the other hand, it assesses humans' behaviour towards things (property), Moreover, it also remains to be seen whether on that same basis it is able to resolve such morally challenging matters, given the absence of a coherent and established line of jurisprudence. Taking into account the jurisprudence to date, we can anticipate that the Tribunal will avoid the exercise of the public morals clause in matters that divide Polish society. 57
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